The historical unity of the East Asian region - defined as made up of China, Korea and Japan - is based on three successive phases: the longue durée of the traditional Sinocentric order, the ear of imperialist conflicts from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, and the post-war developmentalist turn. The idea of a Confucian tradition or region is best understood as an attempt to superimpose a more emphatic conception of cultural identity on this historical constellation, and to rebuild bridges (...) between past and present. For a critical and comparative analysis of the claims made in relation to Confucianism and its modernizing potential, it is essential to move from the issue of capitalist development to a broader civilizational framework. (shrink)

The idea of entangled modernities is best understood as a complement and corrective to that of `multiple modernities': it serves to theorize the global unity and interconnections of modern socio-cultural formations in a non-reductionist and non-functionalist way. But it can also help to highlight complexity and divergence behind the outwardly uniform or parallel patterns of development. This line of thought seems particularly relevant to the history of Communism. The interdependent but divergent trajectories of the two imperial revolutions, Russian and Chinese, (...) exemplify the multiple patterns of entanglement in unusually instructive ways. In both cases, imperial legacies and traditions interacted with modernizing imperatives and geopolitical constraints, as well as with the revolutionary projects proposed as solutions to the imperial crises. The Sino-Soviet entanglement was highly asymmetric; although the Chinese connection seems to have been important at several critical junctures in Soviet history, the impact of the Soviet model on Chinese Communism was incomparably more formative. But the Chinese metamorphoses of the Soviet model deviated from the original in various ways; they were too complex and sometimes too self-destructive to be explained in terms of an adaptive logic. Rather, the transfigurations that took place at various stages - from the beginnings of Chinese Bolshevism to the aberrations of Maoism in power - can be understood as changing patterns of entanglement, combining radicalizing twists to the Soviet model with selective reactivation of Chinese traditions. (shrink)

In the Southeast Asian context, the questions of civilizational identity and civilizational premises of modernity cannot be posed in the same way as with regard to China or India. From a long-term perspective, the most salient features of the region have to do with intercivilizational encounters and their local ramifications. As the debate on `Indianization' has shown, Southeast Asian traditions took shape in active interaction with dominant external models, and it is a flexible combination of imported and local patterns that (...) is most characteristic of the region, rather than any persisting indigenous infrastructure. Cultural patterns of state formation are the most distinctive outcome of this process; they can be traced back to the Indianizing phase, but they also play an important role in the early modern history of the region, and they are relevant to the debate on `re-traditionalization' in contemporary Southeast Asia. (shrink)

It could be conceivable that society is not an organism, that it has no structure, that it functions only temporarily or seemingly. The most obvious analogies are not the best. The Human Province, p.245 True, he [man] wants to “preserve” himself, but he also simultaneously wants other things which are inseparable from this.Crowds and Power, p. 293 The planning nature of man is a very late addition that violates his essential, his transforming nature.The Secret Heart of the Clock, p. 119 (...) Man, regarding himself as the measure of all things, is almost unknown. His progress in self-knowledge is minimal, every new theory obscures more of him than it illuminates. The Conscience of Words, p. 111. (shrink)

This article discusses successive positions of the Frankfurt School, contrasts them to the unfolding ideas of Castoriadis and argues for a critical theory centred on a concept of autonomy, but aware of the obstacles and complications inherent in social–historical reality and its modern configuration. To clarify this perspective, we need a concept of society that distances itself from the Parsonian paradigm, more so than recent theorists of the Frankfurt School have done. The critique of over-integrated images of society, developed by (...) various sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s but not properly assimilated by the mainstream of the discipline and never taken on board by Frankfurt theorists, is an important source of reference, and it can be taken further in the light of Castoriadis’s reflections on the social–historical. The result is a definition of autonomy as a capacity of explicit and unlimited interrogation, confronted with its own hubristic temptations in the context of a multidimensional social world. (shrink)

Contemporary reflections on capitalism as a social-historical formation build on the legacy of classical theorists and comparative analysts. To clarify the main lines of this ongoing debate, it seems useful to distinguish three dichotomies that have been central to interpretations of capitalist development. The question of unity and diversity has been most prominent in the controversies of the past few decades; its ramifications range from micro-economic research on ‘varieties of capitalism’ to less sustained discussions about the place and role of (...) capitalism within the framework of multiple modernities. Another key distinction contrasts systemic perspectives on capitalism with historical ones. In this regard, Schumpeter’s work is particularly interesting, but as an illustration of the problematic rather than an answer to the basic questions. The notion of a spirit of capitalism is most frequently associated with Weber’s work, where the spirit appeared as the source of a dynamic to which it then fell victim. Reconsiderations of the issue have raised questions about more durable versions and more varied expressions of the spirit, less likely to be eliminated by a self-propelling dynamic. Finally, comments on the articles included in the special issue suggest that they all have something to say on all three aspects of the field, but that their most innovative content may consist in attempts to move beyond systemic models of unity. (shrink)

The notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’, which now seems to have become a fashionable cliché, should be discussed in the context of a broader set of questions: the problematic of intercivilizational encounters. This is an important but very underdeveloped part of the research programme now known as civilizational analysis. The article begins with a brief survey of the Indian experience. Indian history includes a long succession of intercivilizational encounters, both those initiated from the West (by Greeks, Muslims and Europeans) (...) and those that brought Indian influence to bear on other regions (as did the spread of Buddhism to East Asia and the ‘Indianization’ of Southeast Asia). These examples serve to sketch a phenomenology of encounters. For a more theoretical approach, the article turns to the work of Benjamin Nelson, who first introduced the concept of intercivilizational encounters. His analyses focus on the encounters that involve contacts or conflicts between the basic ‘structures of consciousness’ that define different civilizations. Such interactions can lead to fusion or to prolonged internal conflicts, but they may also be instructive because of the very absence of significant effects: in the latter case, fundamental blockages to intercivilizational borrowing or engagement are built into the structures of consciousness. For Nelson, the early modern encounter between China and the West was a prime example of that kind. The last part of the article takes the question beyond Nelson’s historical cases and relates it to the advanced phase of modernity, where the dominant type of encounters is three-cornered: it involves Western and non-Western civilizations as well as the new (modern) civilizational patterns adumbrated in the West but open to redefinitions in other contexts. (shrink)

The revival of civilizational analysis is closely linked to a broader cultural turn in the human sciences. Comparative civilizational approaches accept the primacy of culture, but at the same time, they strive to avoid the cultural determinism familiar from twentieth-century sociology, especially from the Parsonian version of functionalism. To situate this twofold strategy within contemporary cultural sociology, it seems useful to link up with the distinction between a strong and a weak program for the sociological analysis of culture, proposed by (...) Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith. The strong program, also described as cultural sociology, stresses the constitutive role of culture in all domains and across the field of social life; the weak program, more precisely the sociology of culture, treats culture as a variable factor among others, and in some important respects subordinate to others. From this point of view, civilizational analysis is, first and foremost, a particularly ambitious version of the strong program: its emphasis on different cultural articulations of the world, as well as on the large-scale and long-term social-historical formations crystallizing around such articulations, adds new dimensions to the autonomy of culture. It also reinforces the hermeneutical stance of cultural sociology and cautions against the acceptance of mainstream explanatory models. On the other hand, the civilizational perspective highlights the variety of interconnections between culture and other components of the social world, and thus takes into account some of the themes favoured by the weak program. (shrink)

The attempts to interpret Russian and Southeast European history in light of a Byzantine background tend to focus on traditions of political culture, and to claim that patterns characteristic of the late Roman Empire have had a formative impact on later developments. But the effects attributed to political culture presuppose a civilizational framework, and arguments on that level must come to grips with evidence of historical discontinuity, during the Byzantine millennium as well as in later centuries and on the periphery (...) of the Byzantium cultural world. The path to a historically grounded civilizational analysis is, however, obstructed by persisting images of Byzantium as a stagnant culture, immobilized by a complete fusion of secular and sacred authority. The article discusses and criticizes some of the most influential versions of this view. (shrink)

This paper discusses the formation of Castoriadis’s concept of imaginary significations and relates it to his changing readings of Marx and Weber. Castoriadis’s reflections on modern capitalism took off from the Marxian understanding of its internal contradictions, but he always had reservations about the orthodox version of this idea. His writings in the late 1950s, already critical of basic assumptions in Marx’s work, located the central contradiction in the very relationship between capital and wage labour. Labour power was not simply (...) transformed into a commodity, as Marx had argued; rather, the instituted attempt to treat it as a commodity was a contradiction in itself, between the subjectivity and the objectification of labour. Castoriadis then moved on to link this claim to Weber’s analysis of the interconnections between capitalism and bureaucracy. The main contradiction of modern capitalism, whether wholly bureaucratised as in the Soviet model or increasingly bureaucratised as in the West, now seemed to be a matter of incompatible systemic imperatives: the need to control and to mobilise the workforce. Finally, difficulties with this model – and with the revolutionary expectations based on it – led to a more decisive break with classical theories and to the formulation of a bipolar image of modernity, where the vision of an autonomous society is opposed to the logic of calculation and domination, embodied in capitalist development. On both sides there is an imaginary component, irreducible to empirical givens or systemic principles. In this regard, Castoriadis remained closer to Weber than to Marx, but he also anticipated, in a distinctive way, later emphasis on the cultural dimension of modernity, and more specifi cally the notion of modernity as a new civilisation. (shrink)